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Abstract
In this review we synthetize the existing contributions using econometric approaches to
examine the influence of institutions and governance on environmental policy, environmental
outcomes, and investments. The paper describes how the relationship between institutions
and various response variables related to environmental performance and environmental
policy have been conceptualized and operationalized in the literature and summarizes the
main findings. The second part of the paper outlines avenues for future research in the
specific context of climate change and energy. We identify various opportunities for
empirical work that have recently emerged with the growing availability of data in the fields
of green investments, climate, and energy policy. Expanding the current empirical literature
towards these research topics is of scientific and policy relevance and can provide important
insights into the broader field of sustainability transition and sustainable development.
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1. Introduction
The transition toward a low-carbon and sustainable economy will require a fundamental
transformation of energy, economic, and social systems. Designing targeted economic and
environmental policies will play a crucial role in steering and fostering the transition but will
need to be combined with a more general improvement of institutions to ensure that policies
are implemented and monitored effectively (Dasgupta, De Cian, and Verdolini 2016).
Environmental interventions are essentially economic policies ultimately implemented by
bureaucrats in a broader institutional setting (Lockwood 2013). Therefore, the ability of
environmental policies to achieve their objectives depends on the political process leading to
policy adoption as well as on the nature of the underlying institutions, dominant ideas and
cultural discourses, the industrial structure, and the distribution of resources and power
(Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Meyer 2003; Hughes and Lipscy 2013).
While the role of governance and institutions has been generally overlooked by the scenario
analysis approach to sustainability transition using quantitative system models (van Vuuren
and Kock 2012), other disciplines such as socio-technical transition studies do highlight the
importance of these contextual factors (Turnheim et al. 2015). The methods used by these
approaches are usually qualitative in nature and often limited to specific case studies, which
makes up-scaling or generalization difficult. Empirical studies within the applied economic
literature on institutions and environment fall in-between these two approaches. They
examine the relationship between institutions, or more broadly political economy factors and
indicators of policy adoption, policy effectiveness, and environmental outcomes
quantitatively. They rely on observed cross-sectional time series, or longitudinal data, and in
some cases on natural experiments. Reduced-form equations building on hypotheses
grounded in theoretical frameworks are generally utilized to formalize simple models testing
a causal relationship between quantifiable variables. The degree of aggregation varies from
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studies focusing on country aggregates to more micro approaches analyzing the behaviors of
consumers, households, and firms.
In this review we synthetize the existing contributions from the applied economic literature
using econometric approaches to examine the influence of institutions and governance on
environmental policy, environmental outcomes, and investments at the national level. We
describe how the relationship between institutions and various response variables influencing
environmental performance or environmental policy have been conceptualized and
operationalized and summarize the main findings.
Review papers usually face a trade-off between inclusiveness and degree of detail. In this
paper we review 55 papers dealing with the impact of institutions and governance on a range
of environmental performance and policy adoption indicators. We classify the main
indicators of institutional quality, environmental performance, and policy that have been used
and summarize the main hypotheses that have been tested. We conclude by outlining avenues
for future research in the specific context of climate change and energy and describe
opportunities for future work. We find that 39 out of the 55 reviewed papers have evaluated
the impact of institutions and governance on environmental performance indicators such as
emissions (methane, carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide), other pollutants
(carbon monoxide, chlorofluorocarbon, and lead), deforestation, land degradation, and
protected areas, while only 5 of these 39 studies have examined the impact of institutions and
governance on green investments. Of the reviewed papers, 16 have investigated the impact of
institutions and governance on policy adoption, half of which use policy stringency as the
dependent variable. The remaining papers focused on the decisions to participate into
international or multilateral environmental agreements.
Our review points out three main findings; first, democratic countries and open societies are
more likely to provide public goods such as environmental protection, and civil and political
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rights are rather influential in ensuring environmental quality, especially in comparison to
authoritarian regimes. More democratic countries are generally associated with greater
participation into international environmental agreements and with better environmental
performance. Second, good governance encourages the adoption of environmental policies
and generally leads to better environmental outcomes. Finally, corruption can be a channel
for environmental degradation, as it could lead to a sub-optimal use of resources and
inefficiencies.
We also highlight that, although the empirical literature on this topic is quite broad, it has
mostly focused on physical performance indicators (e.g. emissions or different kinds of
pollutants) or on policy adoption choices that have become dated (e.g. signing and ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol). We conclude that the field of research to analyze the impact of
institutions on green investments or policy stringency in a more systematic manner is ripe for
investigation and review the few papers that have started approaching this topic.
The remainder of paper is structured as follows; Section 2 provides definitions and concepts
of institutions and governance, Section 3 presents the review of the existing literature
organized in three sections looking into the impacts of institutions and governance on
environmental performance (3.1), environmental policy (3.2), and investments (3.3), Section
4 discusses research gaps and priorities with a focus on the political economy of green
transition, while Section 5 concludes.

2. Definitions and Concepts
The concept of institutions has been used in different contexts but often with different
definitions, making it difficult to provide an unequivocal definition. For example, sociology
refers to institutions as a broader set of a) regulatory, b) cultural-cognitive, and c) normative
rules (Scott 1995). According to this perspective, institutional change refers not only to the
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direct effect of policies and formal prescriptions (institutions type a) but also to changes in
how we see and understand the world, how our mindset influences our decision (institutions
type b), as well as changes in our normative aspirations, and what we consider 'good'
(institutions type c).
Socio-technical transition studies also use a broad notion of governance and institutions
(Turnheim et al. 2015) as describing the key processes of steering and decision-making. This
discipline gives emphasis to the role of different actors beyond the national and state
governments, including actors, organizations, structures, networks and relationships that
contribute to decision-making and influencing societal processes. It highlights the difference
between institutions as referring to the actions of the state or the government and governance
(e.g. the role of non-state actors, such as businesses and nongovernmental organizations in
the process of societal steering).
In this review we adopt an economic perspective and refer to formal institutions (Acemoglu
et al. 2005) as the rules of ‘how markets operate’. They can be further grouped into legal,
political, and economic institutions. Legal institutions take the form of legislature, public or
state-devised legal institutions, and private legal institutions. In economics, political
institutions are defined as the institutions shaping policy decisions by constraining the set of
feasible choices of the decision-makers. They determine the process of creating and enforcing
laws and of governmental policy making. Economic institutions also have overlapping
characteristics with political institutions and their functions are often difficult to disentangle
(Acemoglu et al. 2005). In the political economy literature, political institutions often
determine the scope of economic institutions. Economic institutions must perform functions
such as establishing and protecting property rights, facilitating transactions, permitting
economic co-operation, and organization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010). A related and to
some extent overlapping concept is that of governance, which can be broadly defined as the
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traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a country (Kaufmann
et al. 2000). The World Bank defines governance as the power exercised through a country’s
institutions. In other words, governance is a political concept that includes measures
involving setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling of conflicts over these rules.
Normative and cognitive institutions as defined by Scott (2005) are difficult to measure and
most of the existing environmental economic literature has focused on regulatory institutions
or formal institutions (Joskow 2008 and Kunčič 2014). Table A1 summarizes the indicators
of institutional quality classified into the groups of economic, legal, and political institutions
that have been most frequently used by the economic literature.

3. Institutions and the environment
The theoretical argument for government activity in the context of the environment is
provided by the public-good nature of environmental protection. Private agents
systematically fail to take into account the full costs of pollution due to the associated
externalities, creating the scope for government intervention (Stavins 2004). Relevant
questions include the degree of government intervention and how different forms of
government (political institutions) and electoral arrangements affect environmental
regulations and ultimately environmental performance. The following three sections review
the literature examining the relationship between institutions, environmental outcomes (3.1),
environmental policy adoption (3.2), and environment-related investments.
3.1.

Institutions, Governance and Environmental Performances

A number of papers have investigated whether a statistical relationship exists between
various institutional quality indicators and environmental performance. Table A2 summarizes
the most common environmental performance indicators1 used in the literature as dependent
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The terms environmental performance and environmental quality are used interchangeably in the literature.
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variables. They refer either to pollutants, such as carbon monoxide, chlorofluorocarbon
(CFC), methane, carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and lead content of
gasoline, or to activities related to environmental degradation (deforestation). The most
commonly used institutional indicators are democracy from Polity IV and Freedom House
databases, voice and accountability from the World Governance Indicators (WGI), and
corruption perception index from Transparency International (TI). Some papers have also
used rule of law from WGI and indicators related to the strength of civil society. Indicators
such as lobbying, veto power, and composition of parliamentary systems have also been used.
The main hypothesis being tested using the aforementioned indicators is whether democracy,
transparency, and free flow of information allow the electorate to exert policy pressure on the
government (Barrett and Graddy 2000 and Midlarsky 1998) and facilitate or constraint the
ability of governments to implement such measures. Another hypothesis is whether
democratic countries and open societies are more likely to provide public goods such as
environmental protection (Hughes and Lipscy 2013). In this context, Dasgupta and Mäler
(1995) suggest that civil and political rights are rather influential in ensuring environmental
quality, especially in comparison to authoritarian regimes.
3.1.1 Democracy and Environmental Performance
The most common indicators of institutions and governance used by this subset of literature
are the polity scores and democracy variable from the Polity (III and IV) database, the
Freedom House Index, and the rule of law indicator from WGI. Deacon (1999) finds that
democracies are more likely to ensure positive environmental performance, arguing that nondemocratic regimes or autocracies are less likely to provide such public goods since resources
are concentrated in the hands of a small group, as a result, the burden of public good costs fall
mostly on those controlling these resources. This finding is further supported by a number of
papers including, Deacon (2003); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003); and Bernauer and Koubi
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(2009). Fredriksson et al. (2005) also conclude that both democratic competition and
democratic participation reduces lead content in gasoline while Li and Reuveny (2006) find
that higher levels of democracy (Polity IV) reduces emissions of CO2 and NOx along with
organic pollution in water, deforestation rates, and land degradation.
Torras and Boyce (1998) report that political and civil rights as measurement of democracy in
low-income countries have a positive effect in reducing smoke, heavy particles, and dissolved
oxygen and Etsy and Porter (2005) conclude that civil and political liberties help reduce
urban particulates and SO2. Similarly, Binder and Neumayer (2005) find evidence of greater
democracy resulting in lower pollutant levels with respect to sulfur dioxide, smoke, and
heavy particulates, while Neumayer (2002), using data from 150 countries concludes that
higher democratic quality may result in a greater share of land area being protected. Barrett
and Graddy (2000) also find that greater political freedom leads to better air and water
quality, while comparing democracies and autocracies Ward (2008) concludes that stable
autocracies perform worse on sustainability measures than stable democracies.
However, a number of papers have found negative influence of democracy on environmental
performance. Midlarsky (1998) finds negative effects of democracies on CO2, deforestation,
and soil erosion while Shandra (2007) finds that democracy has no significant effect in
reducing deforestation. Similarly, Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2002) report that weak
democracies are unable to reduce deforestation. Carlsson and Lundstrom (2003) conclude
that political freedom has no effect on reducing levels of emission of carbon dioxide while
Jorgenson (2006) state the same for CH4 emissions. Deacon (1999) also shows a negative
effect of democracy (Polity III) on lead levels. While Scruggs and Rivera (2008), using crosssection OLS find no evidence that countries with long-established democracies have better
environmental performance. Statistical and socio-political arguments have been used to
explain the differences in results. Statistical arguments include different sample sizes and
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different indicators used across the literature. Regarding the issue of sample size, the
environmental data gap between developed and developing countries resulting in selection
bias may have also affected the estimations, while different methodologies have also played
their part. In order to include as many countries as possible authors have often resorted to
using cross-sectional regressions, which only provide a snapshot of situations in a specific
point in time and are more likely to be affected by endogeneity and omitted variable issues.
In general, the use of simple OLS type regressions might lead to results that are not as robust.
A socio-political argument explaining the lack of evidence of a relationship between
democracy and environmental performance has been put forward by Olson (1982), stating
that as democracies become more mature, the growing number of interest groups is less likely
to act and cooperate in common interest since the gains from the collective good
environmental protection decreases. Congleton (1992) also argue that democracies often have
shorter policy span due to political uncertainty hence cannot undertake the long-run reforms
required for climate change.
3.1.2 Governance and Environmental Performance
Unlike the indicators of political institutions such as democracy and corruption, rule of law
has a rather clear-cut prediction implication - stronger governance usually leads to better
environmental policy adoption measures and outcomes. Castiglione et al. (2013) show that
stronger rule of law results in a reduction of pollution, while Castiglione et al. (2012) find
negative relationship between rule of law and pollution, demonstrating that when rule of law
is strong, the turning point of the Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC) occurs at a lower level
of income per capita, thus, decreasing emissions. Culas (2007) conclude that enforceability of
contract by governments reduces rate of deforestation, while Bhattarai and Hammig (2001)
find that political rights and civil liberty results in a reduction of the annual deforestation rate
of forest and woodlands.
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However, a selection of papers have found no significant effect or even an opposite
relationship. However, these results seem to vary depending on the indicator for
environmental performance, e.g. Murdoch et al. (1997) find that civil liberties and political
freedom has positive impact on sulfur cutbacks but less so for NOX in Europe.
3.1.3 Corruption and Environmental Performance
Corruption can be a channel for environmental degradation as it could lead to a sub-optimal
use of resources and inefficiencies. When officials are more susceptible to being bribed, they
are more likely to allow activities that are damaging to the environment. Welsch (2004)
studies the impact of corruption on pollution and finds that corruption has both direct and
indirect impact on pollution, where direct impact refers to the effect of corruption on
pollution via less stringent environmental laws and indirect effect refers to the effect of
corruption on per capita income and the resultant impact on pollution. The author concludes
that corruption increases the levels of pollution regarding NO2, CO2, total suspended
particulate

concentration,

total

suspended

particulate

concentration,

phosphorus

concentration, and suspended solids. Similarly, Cole (2007) finds that corruption increases
per capita emissions of sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide while the indirect impact also
increased in higher income countries.
A number of other papers have found evidence of corruption adversely affecting biodiversity
and negatively affecting sustainability (Lopez and Mitra 2000; Meyer et al. 2003; Damania et
al. 2004; Wright et al. 2007; and Koyuncu and Yilmaz 2009)2. However, a common criticism
of these papers is the use of aggregate measure of sustainability such as the Ecological
Sustainability Index (ESI).
As summarized in Table 2A, papers considering multiple performance indicators such as
Torres and Boyce (1998), Welsh (2004), Li and Revuveny (2006), and Scruggs and Rivera
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For a detailed review on natural resources and corruption, see Kolstad and Søreide (2009).
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(2008), generally find robust results across indicators. The only studies finding variation
across indicators are Murdhoch et al. (1997) and Milarsky (1998).
Figure 1 summarizes the main findings from this branch of literature (also listed in Table 2A)
by performance indicators and institutional variables. The studies that find a prevailing
positive effect are those on air pollution and other emissions, which include mostly SO2,
NO2, and CH4, while the evidence on CO2 emissions is mixed. The right panel of Figure 1
shows that whereas democracy tends to have an ambiguous effect, civil and political
freedom, and governance tend to have a positive impact.

Figure 1: Institutions, Governance, and Environmental Performances - Main findings by performance indicator
(left) and by institutional variables (right).

Note: Positive values refer to a positive relationship between institutional quality (e.g. more democratic
countries, less corrupted countries, more civil and political freedom, better governance improve environmental
performance) and the performance indicator. Negative values refer to a negative relationship. Ambiguous values
are studies finding evidence for both. NS refer to a not-statistically significant relationship.
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3.2 Institutions, Governance, and Environmental Policy
In this section we examine the literature on the impact of different institutional settings on
governments’ decisions to adopt environmental policies. We focus on the literature
investigating the impact of institutions and governance on environmental policy adoption and
implementation (see Table 3A). This body of the literature is less extensive than the one on
institutions and environmental performance. The most commonly used indicators of political
institutions are democracy (Polity IV and Freedom House), corruption (TI), composition of
parliaments and government, economic institutions, and various governance indicators from
WGI.
3.2.1 Democracy and Environmental Policy
Neumayer (2003) concludes that democracies exhibit stronger international environmental
commitment than non-democracies while political freedom seems to have a positive impact
on environmental policy but economic freedom has no effect. Similarly, Damania et al.
(2003) show that civil freedom has an insignificant effect on compliance with international
environmental agreements. Murdoch et al. (2003) use a two-stage game and spatial probit
analysis to find that democracy can be a barrier to collective action on international
environmental treaties. Fredriksson and Ujhely (2005) conclude that greater number of
government units reduces the positive impact of environmental agreements and that greater
environmental lobby group strength raises the probability of ratification. Fredriksson et al.
(2005) find that greater political competition and number of environmental groups raises the
stringency of environmental policies but democratic participation affects environmental
policy stringency only in countries with sufficiently high degree of political competition.
These papers use environmental lobbying, democratic participation, and political competition
as the major independent variables. Battig and Bernauer (2009) use a panel regression
approach and show that the effect of democracy on levels of political commitment to climate

12

change mitigation is positive but the effect on policy outcomes, measured in terms of
emission levels and trends, is ambiguous (see previous section). In one of the earliest papers
on this topic, Congleton (1992) concludes that authoritarian regimes enact less stringent
environmental standards than democratic regimes, liberal democracies are more willing to
regulate environmental pollution and that international agreements on environmental matters
attract more signatories as the number of democratic regimes increases.
3.2.2 Governance and Environmental Policy
Fredriksson et al. (2007) find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the
probability of Kyoto Protocol ratification and that this effect increases with levels of
corruption. Fankhauser et al. (2014), using negative binomial and logit models report no
significant impact of political orientation on the number of climate laws passed. The authors
also find that propensity to legislate is heavily influenced by the passage of similar laws in
other countries, indicating towards the potential role of peer pressure and/or learning effects.
Very few papers have attempted to investigate the impact of factors such as lobbying and
veto power on environmental policy. This remains one of the important gaps in the literature.
Roberts et al. (2004) find that freedom of expression and citizens’ ability to participate in
selecting their government, and pressure from NGOs are the most important factors in
determining a country’s propensity to sign environmental treaties, while Fredriksson et al.
(2004), using stratified hazard models find similar results. Fredriksson and Millimet (2004),
using propensity score matching find that countries with propositional systems tend to have
stricter environmental policies and Fredriksson et al. (2005) show that environmental lobby
groups tend to increase the stringency of environmental policy. Moreover, the authors
conclude that political competition tends to raise policy stringency, in particular where
citizens’ participation in the democratic process is widespread.
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3.2.3 Corruption and Environmental Policy
Using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to investigate the impact of corruption on
environmental policy, Fredriksson et al. (2004) state that corruption increases energy waste
by reducing the stringency of energy regulations and that lobbying is less successful in the
larger sectors. Murdoch et al. (2003) also suggested that lobbying by environmental groups is
an influencing factor for the ratification of Kyoto Protocol. This particular notion has been
empirically tested in recent papers that show that the strength of the environmental lobby and
the level of corruption in that country are drivers of ratification of Kyoto (Fredriksson et al.
2007 and Fredriksson and Ujhelyi 2005)3.
Damania (2002) state that environmental regulations are imposed and monitored by
bureaucrats who may be corrupted and act on their personal interest. While Fredriksson et al.
(2004) investigate the impact of corruption4 on energy policy and find that higher degree of
corruption among the bureaucrats result in less stringent policies and increased coordination
costs for special interest groups means more stringent policies and capital owners and
workers have opposite lobbying interests on energy policy. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003)
and Damania et al. (2003) show that higher corruption reduces environmental regulations
stringency, which is reflected in lower improvements in energy intensity but this effect
declines as political stability increases. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) also provide
evidence of the adverse effects of corruption on the effectiveness of environmental
regulations using cross-country data. Furthermore, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2011) find that an
increase in the CPI results in a reduction in the environmental protection index, while
Ivanova (2011) concludes that though countries with more effective environmental
regulations may have higher reported levels of emissions but their actual pollution levels are
likely to be lower than in nations with less effective regulation. As mentioned in section
3
4

Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International and World Bank WGI
Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International
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3.2.2, only a few papers have attempted to investigate the impact of factors such as lobbying
and veto power on environmental policy.
Figure 2 summarizes the main findings from this branch of literature (also listed in Table 3A)
from papers investigating the relationship between institutions and environmental policy
adoption or implementation. The agreement among the reviewed papers is almost
unequivocal, with only 2 out of 16 studies finding a negative or an insignificant relationship.
Most studies in this branch of literature have used cross-section methods but the more recent
papers have used panel data analysis.
Figure 2: Institutions, Governance, and Environmental Policy - Main findings by performance indicator (left)
and by institutional variables (right).

Note: Positive values refer to a positive relationship between institutional quality (e.g. more democratic
countries, less corrupted countries, more civil and political freedom, better governance improve environmental
performance) and the environmental policy indicator. Negative values refer to a negative relationship.
Ambiguous values are studies finding evidence for both. NS refer to a not-statistically significant relationship.

3.3 Institutions, Governance, Investments, and Innovation
The papers reviewed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have mostly used physical indicators such as
different types of pollutants or indicators of pollution intensity as indicators of environmental
performance. Since investments and innovation, even though not necessarily directly related
to energy and the environment, are also important topics in the literature on sustainability
15

transition, we review the papers that investigate the relationship between institutions,
investments, and innovation within and outside the energy and environment domain.
3.3.1 Institutions, Governance, and Investments
There is a rather broad literature on the influence of institutions and governance on
investments, especially on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). Brunetti et al. (1997) conclude
that political instability increases uncertainty, which makes a country less attractive to foreign
investors while Busse and Hefeker (2007) find that government stability, democratic rights,
and law and order have a significantly positive influence on FDI inflows. Jensen (2003, 2006,
and 2007) and Feng (2001) also find that democracy reduces political risks in countries and
encourages FDI inflows.
The dominant view in the literature is that good governance and low levels of corruption is
expected to promote investments and attract FDI and that a malfunctioning government
increases both costs and investment risk. These findings have been empirically supported by
several studies (Globerman and Shapiro 2003; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006; Gani 2007; and
Staats and Biglaiser 2012). However, a number of papers have provided contrary evidence
that corruption often attracts FDI. According to Bellos and Subasat (2012), this is the result
of the prevailing effect of “grease the wheels” mechanism, which argues that corruption can
compensate for poor governance and speed up inefficient bureaucratic processes in order to
attract FDI (Bardhan 1997; Kaufmann and Weim 1999; Meon and Sekkat 2005; Mironovm
2005; and Bellos and Subasat 2011).
In the context of green investments, Gennaioli and Tavoni (2011) study the link between
public support schemes for renewable energy and corruption and find that the number of
green energy projects increased in Italian provinces with corruption. Specifically, an increase
in criminal activity results in an increase in the number of green projects. The authors state
that inefficient institutions usually foster corruption. Bellos and Subasat (2012) also use the
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term “sand the wheels” in the cases where corruption acts as a deterrent to FDI. A number of
papers find a negative relationship between corruption and investment in support of this view
(Mauro 1995; Mauro 1998; Beata and Wei 2000; and Habib and Zurawicki 2002).
However, the literature on the impact of these factors as determinants of environmental
investment and investments on clean energy is rather limited. Iyer et al. (2015), in an
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) framework, find that investment risks are higher in
regions with inferior institutions. The authors suggest that institutional reforms leading to
lower investment risks could be an important element of cost-effective climate mitigation
strategies. Verdolini and Vona (2015) conclude that reduced entry barriers, measured using
OECD’s indicators of market regulation (rent on market entry, privatization, and
unbundling), results in an increase in investment on renewable energy. However, the authors
find no evidence of institutional quality influencing investments in renewable energy. Masini
and Menichetti (2013) examine the impacts of non-financial factors in Renewable Energy
(RE) investments, including behavioral (priori belief, propensity for radical technologies,
investors’ knowledge of the RE operational context) and institutional factors (institutional
pressure from peers, consultants, and published sources of information). The authors find that
the behavioral context plays an important role at shaping the incentive to invest in RE and the
beliefs about technical feasibility and proven performance seem to be particularly important.
3.3.2 Institutions, Governance, and Innovation
The literature on the impact of institutions and governance on innovation spans several
decades but includes very few empirical studies. In one of the early studies, Freeman (1987)
concludes that quality of institutions is critical for the creation of new technologies while
Lundvall (1992) states that the economic structure and the institutional set-up have a strong
impact on innovations.
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Weak institutions increase uncertainty and are likely to have an adverse effect on innovation
while efficient institutions may expedite the process of registering new patents5, diffusion of
knowledge, enforcement of property rights, and reduce the uncertainty of new projects
(Romer 1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992; and Grossman and Helpman 2001). Sala-i-Martin
(2002) states that it rather difficult to incentivize innovation without existence of efficient
institutions. Using a mixed-model approach, Levchenko (2007) shows that countries with
better institutions are more likely to specialize in the production of highly technical goods. In
a theoretical framework, Tebaldi and Elmslie (2008) shows that the impact of institutions on
innovation spillovers to income is likely to improve as the quality of institutions improve.
More recent papers also suggest that better institutions are likely to aid innovation
(Habiyaremye and Raymond 2013 and Tebaldi and Elmslie 2013). Tebaldi and Elmslie
(2013) uses an IV approach to study the impact of control of corruption on US patent counts
between 1970 and 2003 and find that improving control of corruption increases the
probability of patents filing and registration. Silve and Plekhanov (2015) that good quality of
economic institutions (measured by WGI) boosts long-term economic growth through
innovation. Dasgupta, De Cian, and Verdolini (2016), using data for 20 OECD countries
during 1995 – 2010, investigate the impact of environmental policy stringency (both market
and non-market instruments), governance, political orientation of governments, and
distribution of resources to energy intensive industries on energy R&D and patents. The
authors find that market-based incentives and to some extent non-market based incentives,
results in dynamic efficiency gains; countries with better governance are characterized by
higher levels of energy-related R&D; left-wing governments are more likely to devote R&D
resources to the energy sector; while larger energy intensive sectors can induce market-size
effects and have more power to lobby for more resources to be allocated to energy R&D.
5

In the empirical literature investigating the impact of institutions and governance on innovation, patents are
generally used as a measure of innovation.
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3.3.3 Corruption and Innovation
In general, the literature finds that corruption is harmful to innovation (Anokhin and Schulze
2009; Waldemar 2012). Murphy et al. (1993) argues that corruption from government
officials particularly affects innovators due to the fact that these firms have a high demand for
government permits and licenses. Similarly, Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that innovative firms
are more likely to pay bribes compared to non-innovators. On the other hand, it has also been
argued that corruption can be somewhat beneficial by creating opportunities for illicit private
gains for firms, such as paying “cash for contracts” (Asiedu and Freeman 2009). These
findings are in line with “grease the wheel” and “sand the wheel” by Bellos and Subasat
(2011).

4. Existing Gaps and Future Directions
The literature reviewed in this paper indicates towards two major gaps in the applied
economic literature on institutions and environment. The first gap concerns the relationship
between institutions and policy adoption. With respect to the choice of policy indicators, only
a few papers have studied the impact on policy stringency. As for the institutional factors,
very few papers have investigated the influence of lobbying and veto power.
Understanding the drivers of policy adoption and stringency and how various economic and
political institutions influence these decisions are some of the topics that need further
investigation, especially in the context of climate and renewable energy policies. New and
improved data on policies such as the Environmental Policy Stringency dataset by OECD
(Botta and Koźluk 2014), offers opportunities to investigate relationships between
institutional factors and policy stringency. Questions of potential interest include whether the
broader institutional setting affects decisions on the choice of instruments and whether there
is a causal relationship between institutions and policy stringency.
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The second gap concerns the relationship between institutions and environmental
performances. The existing literature has focused on physical environmental performance
indicators, whereas only a few recent papers (see Section 3.3) explore how institutional
quality affects green investments and clean technology costs. Future research could explore
the relationship between institutions and variables related to green investments and the green
economy. Possible indicators of green investment include R&D investments and electricity
generation from renewable sources such as hydropower, geothermal, solar, tides, wind,
biomass, and biofuels or installed capacities of these sources. Future research could also
examine the influence of institution on technological change in relation to energy efficiency
improvements or decarbonization patterns.
A large body of literature analyze innovation in energy and climate‐friendly technologies and
their diffusion across borders (see Carraro et al. 2010 for a review), including developing
countries (Verdolini and Galeotti 2011; Bosetti and Verdolini 2012) but only a few of these
contributions have examined the role of institutional factors. The literature on institution and
the environment surveyed in this review suggests that other institutional factors such as
corruption, transparency of governments, quality of bureaucratic quality are also likely to
influence the ability to adopt and implement environmental policies, choice of policy
instruments, and the effectiveness of the policy implemented. Governance is also a key
factor, as weak governance creates frictions and leads to increased risks and associated costs
in R&D and technological investments. In the case of governance, various institutional
indicators are available besides the Worldwide Governance Indicators, including the
Institutional Quality Dataset (Kunčič, 2014) and the Government Transparency Index
(Hollyer et al. 2011).
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5. Conclusion
This paper reviews the main findings of the empirical contributions examining the
relationship between institutions and environmental outcomes, environmental policy
adoption, green investments, and energy innovation. Our analysis reveals that the literature
on environmental performance is more extensive than the one studying environmental policy.
Although there is mixed evidence on the impact of institutional quality on performance and
policy adoption, the majority of the studies find a positive relationship between different
indicators of institutional quality, performance, and policy adoption. Our survey also shows
that results are sensitive to the indicator of institutional quality being used and divergent
results can often be explained by differences in methodologies and data. For example, in
order to include as many countries as possible, authors have often resorted to using crosssectional regressions, leading to results that more prone to omitted variable bias and
endogeneity. Regarding the data, the gap in availability of environmental data between the
developed and the developing countries often results in a selection bias.
This review indicates several unexploited opportunities for future empirical work that have
emerged thanks to the growing availability of data on environmental policy and performance
indicators. It suggests that the time is ripe for expanding the analysis to examine the
relationship between governance, institutions, green investments, and energy innovation.
Future research could also explore the impact of institutions and governance on indicators
more directly related to low-carbon transformations such as carbon and energy intensity and
renewable energy mix and shares. The literature on the relationship between institutions and
policy also shows a gap regarding the drivers of climate policy adoption which future
research could explore. Finally, there is scope of improving the estimates by using robust
empirical techniques.
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Broadening the empirical evidence on the relationship between institutions, environmental
outcomes, and policies could also help improve the representation of institutional factors in
the quantitative system models used to develop long-term sustainability transition scenarios.
The new scenario framework integrating future climate and society (O’ Neil et al. 2015)
acknowledges the importance of policy and institutions as one of the dimensions of the
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). The economic approach to institutions and the
environment reviewed in this paper can offer empirical guidance to models. An example of
how the empirical evidence could be used to inform models is provided by Iyer et al. (2015).
This particular paper differentiated investment costs across regions on the basis of
institutional quality and uses an Integrated Assessment Model to conclude that institutional
reforms leading to lower investment risks could be an important element of cost-effective
climate mitigation strategies.
Our review suggests that it is critical to expand the existing empirical literature on institutions
and the environment by incorporating energy and climate change related issues, which could
contribute to the broader field of sustainability transition and sustainable development.
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Appendix
Table 1A: Classification of Institutional Proxies
INSTITUTIONAL PROXY

SOURCE
WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WB WGI )
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

Voice and Accountability
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

TYPE

GOVERNANCE

WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WB WGI )
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Government Effectiveness
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

GOVERNANCE

WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WB WGI )
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Regulatory Quality
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

GOVERNANCE

WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (WORLD BANK)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ
Ease of Doing Business Index (1=most business-friendly regulations). Ranking of economies from 1 to
189, higher rankings (a low numerical value) indicate better, usually simpler, regulations for businesses
and stronger protections of property rights.

Total Tax Rate (% of commercial profits)
Amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses after accounting for allowable
deductions and exemptions as a share of commercial profits
Time to resolve insolvency (years)
Time to resolve insolvency is the number of years from the filing for insolvency in court until the
resolution of distressed assets.
Rule of Law
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Strength of Intellectual Property Rights
Data on the strength of the legal environment for patenting in five year‐time steps from 1960 to 2005.
The index contains the impacts of five categories: the coverage of research fields in which inventions
can be patented, the membership in international agreements, criteria regarding the loss of patent
protection, the enforcement rules, and the duration of patent protection.
Informal payments to public officials (% of firms)
Informal payments to public officials are the percentage of firms expected to make informal payments
to public officials to "get things done" with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, and
the like.
Control of Corruption
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is
perceived to be. It is a composite index, a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption,
collected by a variety of reputable institutions.
Bribe Payers Index (BPI)
Measuring the supply side of corruption in international business transaction, the Bribe Payers Index is
a ranking of leading exporting countries according to the perceived likelihood of their firms to bribe
abroad.
Institutionalized Democracy (eleven-point scale; 0-10)
Measured by competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment,
openness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.
Institutionalized Autocracy (eleven-point scale; 0-10)
Lack of political competitiveness, lack of competitiveness of executive recruitment, regulation of
political participation, lack of openness of executive recruitment and the lack of constraints on the chief
executive
POLITY
Computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score; the resulting unified polity
scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)
POLITY2
Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in
order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the
combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment to convert instances of standardized
authority scores to conventional polity scores
Electoral Democracy
An electoral democracy designation requires a score of 7 or better in the Electoral Process subcategory
and an overall political rights score of 20 or better.
Civil Freedom
Civil liberties, including freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They
have an established and generally fair legal system that ensures the rule of law (including an
independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of opportunity for
everyone, including women and minority groups.
Political Freedom
Range of political rights, including free and fair elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule,
political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and the
interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and government.

GOVERNANCE

WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (WORLD BANK)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.TAX.TOTL.CP.ZS
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (WORLD BANK)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.ISV.DURS

GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE

WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WB WGI )
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
GOVERNANCE
Ginarte and Park (1997), Park (2008)
LEGAL

WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (WORLD BANK)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.FRM.CORR.ZS

WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WB WGI )
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

POLITICAL

POLITICAL

Transparency International
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014
POLITICAL
Transparency International
http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011
POLITICAL
Polity IV
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2014.xls

POLITICAL

Polity IV
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2014.xls
POLITICAL
Polity IV
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2014.xls

POLITICAL

Polity IV
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2014.xls
POLITICAL
Freedom House
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-andsubcategory-scores
Freedom House
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-andsubcategory-scores

Freedom House
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-andsubcategory-scores

POLITICAL

POLITICAL

POLITICAL

Source: Compiled by the Authors.
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Table 2A: Literature Survey: Institutions and Environmental Performance
Paper

Dependent Variable(s)

Explanatory Variables

Methodology

Result

Congleton (1992).
Political Institutions and Pollution Control.

Methane and CFC

Democracy (Gastil, 1987)

Murdoch et al. (1997).
A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulfur versus
Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe

Reduction sulfur and nitrogen oxides

Indices of civil liberties and
political freedom (Gastil,
1983; 1988; and 1989)

Democratic regimes produce more
methane in total but significantly less
per unit of national output.
Positive impact on sulfur cutbacks not
for nitrogen oxides

Midlarsky (1998).
Democracy and the environment: an empirical
assessment.

Deforestation, carbon dioxide
emission, soil erosion by water, and
protected land area

Democracy

2SLS and Cross-section
Logit
118 countries
OLS
25 European
countries;
1985, 1987, 1990, and 1992
OLS Panel regression

Torras and Boyce (1998).
Income, inequality, and pollution: a
reassessment of the environmental Kuznets
Curve

Sulfur dioxide, smoke, heavy
particles, dissolved oxygen, fecal
coliform, safe water, sanitation

Political rights and civil
liberties

GLS
18–52 cities in 19–58
countries
1977–1991

Deacon (1999).
The Political Economy of EnvironmentDevelopment Relationships: A Preliminary
Framework.
Barrett and Graddy (2000).
Freedom, growth, and the environment.

Lead content

Types of Democracy (CrossNational Time-Series Data
Archive and Polity III)

Panel OLS
1972 – 1992
48 countries

Lead content declines with democratic
regimes compared to dictatorships.

Air pollutants, water pollutants, fecal
and total coliforms

Civil and Political Freedom Freedom House

FE and RE OLS
5-31 countries

Bhattarai and Hammig (2001).
Institutions and the Environmental Kuznets
curve for deforestation: A cross-country
analysis for Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Deforestation

Sum of political rights and
civil liberty (Freedom House)

FGLS
66 countries from Latin
America, Africa, and Asia
1972–1991

An increase in civil and political
liberties generally improves
environmental quality.
Political rights and civil liberty reduces
annual deforestation rate of forest and
woodlands.

Ehrhardt-Martinez,
Crenshaw and Jenkins (2002).
Deforestation and the Environmental Kuznets
Curve: Cross-National Investigation of
Intervening Mechanisms
Neumayer (2002).
Do democracies exhibit stronger international
environmental commitment? A cross-country
analysis.

Annual rate of deforestation

Scope of governmental actions
and Democracy (Polity II)

OLS with White correction
LDCs
1980-1995

Weak democracies are unable to reduce
deforestation.

Percentage of their land area under
protections status

Combined index of political
rights and civil (Freedom
House,), combined index of
democracy and autocracy
(Polity IV), Vanhanen’s index
of democracy, and
Voice and accountability
(WB)
Political and civil freedom
(Freedom House)

Cross-section OLS
206 countries

Democracies and countries with higher
Freedom Index put greater percentage
of their land area under protections
status.

Box-Cox regression
75 countries
1975-1995
FE OLS
130 countries
1980-1996
Cross-section OLS
99-115 countries

Political freedom has no effect on
reducing levels of emission of CO2.

Improved control of corruption reduces
rate of deforestation.

Carlsson and Lundstrom (2003).
The Effects of Economic and
Political Freedom on CO2 Emissions.
Deacon (2003).
Dictatorship, Democracy, and the Provision of
Public Goods.
Meyer et al. (2003).
Institutional, social and economic roots of
deforestation: a cross-country comparison.
Meyer et al. (2003).
Institutional, Social and Economic Roots of
Deforestation: Further
Evidence of an Environmental Kuznets
Relation?
Frediksson et al. (2005). Environmentalism,
democracy and pollution control.

CO2 emissions

Lead content of gasoline

Rate of deforestation

Cross-National Time Series
Data Archive (Banks, 1997)
and Polity IV
Control of corruption

No evidence of democracies improving
soil erosion by chemicals, and
freshwater availability, and even
negative effects of democracies over
CO2, deforestation, and soil erosion by
water. The study only finds a positive
effect of democracy on protected land.
Civil liberties improve environmental
quality, particularly in low-income
countries.

Lead concentrations are lower under
democracy than autocracy.

Deforestation

Property Rights (Freedom
House) and Control of
Corruption Index (WB)

Cross-section OLS
117 countries

Countries with less corruption are less
likely to liquidate forest assets.

Lead content of gasoline

Number of environmental
lobby groups, democratic
participation, and political
competition

Cross-section OLS, Tobit,
and 2SLS
104 countries
Around the year 1996

Neumayer (2003).
Are left-wing party strength and corporatism
good for the environment? Evidence from
panel analysis of air pollution in OECD
countries.

Sulphur dioxide; nitrogen dioxide;
carbon monoxide; carbon dioxide

FE/RE regression
21 OECD countries, 1980,
1990
and 1999

Welsch (2004).
Corruption, growth, and the environment: a
cross-country analysis.

Urban SO2 concentration, Urban NO2
concentration, urban total suspended
particulate concentration, dissolved
oxygen demand, phosphorus
concentration, suspended solids, SO2,
NO2, volatile organic compound
emissions, fertilizer consumption,
pesticide use, industrial organic
pollutants
Sulphur dioxide, smoke, and heavy
particles

Left-wing party strength (the
share of green/left-libertarian
party seats as a percentage of
all seats, the share of
traditional left-wing party
seats, and the share of cabinet
portfolios of left-wing parties Comparative Parties Data Set
of Swank, 2002)
Corruption (ESI)

Increase in the number of
environmental lobby groups,
democratic competition and
participation reduces lead content in
gasoline.
Green or left-libertarian parliamentary
strength is associated with lower levels
for all five air pollutants. Traditional
left-wing party strength is possibly also
associated with lower pollution levels,
but the evidence is less consistent and
robust.

Binder and Neumayer (2005). Environmental
pressure group strength and air pollution:

ENGOs’ strength and
Democracy (Policy IV)

Cross-section OLS and SUR
122 countries
Most recent year available;
1990–
1996

Corruption generally increases pollution
and the effect is particularly strong in
low income countries.

Panel OLS, RE, and IV
regression

ENGO strength is effective in reducing
air pollution levels in the form of SO2,
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17-35 countries, 1977-1988

smoke and heavy particulates.

Etsy and Porter (2005).
National Environmental Performance: An
Empirical Analysis of Policy Results and
Determinants .
Jorgenson (2006).
“Global warming and the neglected greenhouse
gas: a cross-national study of the social causes
of methane emissions intensity
Li and Reuveny (2006).
Democracy and Environmental
Degradation.
Cole (2007).
Corruption, income and the environment: An
empirical
Analysis.

An empirical analysis.
Urban particulate levels, and sulphur
dioxide

Civil and political Liberties Environmental Sustainability
Index (ESI)

OLS
40–70 countries

Civil and political liberties help reduce
urban particulates and SO2.

CH4 intensity

Index of democratization

Cross-section OLS with
listwise deletion
39-68 countries for 1995

Democratization has no effect on
methane intensity

Carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
organic pollution in water,
deforestation, and land degradation
Sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide

Democracy and autocracy
(Polity IV),

Panel and cross-section OLS
105-143 countries
1961-1997
Instrumental Variable RE
94 countries
1987–2000

Culas (2007).
Deforestation and the environmental Kuznets
curve:
An institutional perspective.
Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2007).
Democratic institutions versus autocratic
regimes: The case of environmental policy

Deforestation of forests and
woodlands

Enforceability of contract

Democracy improves environmental
quality regarding all the dependent
variables.
Corruption is estimated to have a
positive direct impact on per capita
emissions. Indirect effects are found to
be negative and larger in absolute value
than direct effects for the majority of
the sample income range.
Better enforceability of
Contracts reduce deforestation.

Greenhouse gases - reductions in
carbon dioxide per unit of GDP, and
carbon dioxide emitted per capita

Democracies - parliamentary,
presidential-congressional,
proportional, and/or
majoritarian systems
compared to dictatorships.
Average of political rights and
civil liberties (Freedom
House)

Shandra (2007).
Economic dependency, repression, and
deforestation:
A quantitative, cross-national analysis.
Wright et al. (2007).
Poverty and corruption compromise tropical
forest reserves.

Deforestation

Corruption (ICRG)

FE and RE OLS
14 countries from Latin
America, Africa and Asia
1972–1994
Cross-section Propensity
score matching
163 countries from late
1990’s.

Parliamentary democracies achieve
greater reductions in greenhouse gases.
While presidential democracies act
similar to autocracies.

Cross-section OLS
67 countries around 1990

Deforestation increases in nations with
higher levels of repression.

Number of fires

Corruption (TI)

Non-parametric sign test and
OLS
37 countries
2002-2004

Reserves are least effective at reducing
fire frequency in many poorer countries
and in countries beset by corruption.

Scruggs and Rivera (2008).
Political Regimes, Democratic Institutions and
Environmental
Sustainability: A Cross-national analysis.
Ward (2008).
Liberal Democracy and Sustainability

Carbon monoxide, biochemical
oxygen demand,
SO2, NO2, CO2, CH4, protected areas,
and forest land
Carbon footprint

Democracy (Freedom House
and Polity IV)

Cross-section OLS
169 countries,

No evidence that long-established
democratic countries perform better.

Polity score, political system

Cross-sectional analysis
60-128 countries
around the year 2000

Bernauer and Koubi (2009).
Political Determinants of Environmental
Quality.

Sulphur dioxide

RE GLS
107 cities in 42 countries
from 1971-1996

Koyuncu and Yilmaz (2009).
The Impact of Corruption on Deforestation: a
Cross-Country Evidence.

Rate of deforestation

Democracy (Mesquita et al.,
2003), Presidential vs.
Parliamentary (Mesquita et al.,
2003), Civil liberties (Freedom
House)
Corruption (TI, BI, and ICRG)

Stable core autocracies perform worse
on strong sustainability than stable core
democracies. Liberal democracy too
generally promotes weak sustainability
Democracy reduces pollution,
presidential democracies provide a
cleaner environment than parliamentary
democracies, and civil liberties improve
the environment.
Corruption increases rate of
deforestation.

Ivanova (2011).
Corruption and air pollution in Europe.

Sulphur emissions

Corruption and law and order
(ICRG)

Tavoni and Gennaioli (2011).
Clean or “Dirty” Energy: Evidence on a
Renewable Energy Resource Curse

Number of wind plants and total
capacity installed

Castiglione et al. (2012).
Rule of Law and the Environmental Kuznets
Curve: Evidence for Carbon Emissions.

EKC and carbon emissions

Number of charges made by
police for criminal association
activity and total criminal
activity Rule of law Kaufman (2010)

Panel OLS, difference-indifferences
34 South-Italian provinces
1990-2007
2SLS
28 countries 1996 to 2008

Castiglione et al. (2013).
Institutional enforcement, environmental
quality and economic development.

Income and pollution (carbon dioxide)

Rule of law Kaufman (2010)

Panel VAR
33 high-income countries
1996–2008

Koubi et al. (2012).
Climate variability, economic growth, and civil
conflict.

1st stage: Economic growth
2nd stage: Onset of civil conflict

Polity (Polity IV)

2SLS
Global dataset 1980–2004

Masini and Menichetti (2013).
Investment Decisions in the Renewable Energy
Sector: an Analysis of Non-Financial Drivers.

Renewable energy share in the
investment portfolio

Institutional pressure from
industry peers, consultants,
and published technical
information

Cross-section OLS and
logistic regression.
Survey data from 93
investors in Europe

Iyer et al. (2015).
Improved representation of investment
decisions in assessments of CO2 mitigation.

Investment risks across technologies
and regions in the electricity
generation sector

Institutional quality

IAM - Global Change
Assessment Model

WLS
100 countries
1980-90, 1990-95, 19902000
ML with FE and SUR
39 European countries
1999-2003

Decline in corruption and
improvements in law and order reduces
sulphur emissions. Actual emission
levels in countries with more effective
regulations are likely to be lower.
Expansion of the wind energy sector
has been driven by quality of political
institutions, through their effect on
criminal association.
Negative relationship between pollution
and rule of law, when
rule of law is strong, the turning point
of the EKC occurs at a lower level of
income per
capita, thus, decreasing emissions
Higher income implies stronger rule of
law and vice-versa. Rule of law has a
negative relationship with pollution.
No evidence that climate variability
affects economic growth. Weak
evidence that non-democratic countries
are more likely to experience civil
conflict when economic conditions
deteriorate.
Institutional pressure of both peers and
outside consultants has a strong
negative impact on portfolio - forces
them to concentrate investments on a
few specific technologies.
Investment in low-carbon technologies
is lower in regions with inferior
institutions.
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Vona and Verdolini (2015).
Drivers of investments in cleaner energy.

Change in installed capacity of
renewable and fossil efficient as a
fraction total capacity

Dasgupta, De Cian, and Verdolini (2016).
The political economy of energy innovation.

Innovation measured by power and
energy R&D intensity and power and
environmental patent intensity

Policy instruments supporting
either renewable or fossil
efficient technologies -WEO
Policy Database
Institutional quality (WGI),
governments’ political
orientation, and lobbying

FE difference-in-differences
27 OECD countries over the
years 1990-2007
FE OLS
20 countries
1995-2010

Environmental policy has a positive
effect on investment in renewable
energy technologies but fossil efficient
technologies seem less affected.
Stringent environmental policies better
governance provide incentives for
energy innovation while left-leaning
governments and market size attract
energy R&D investments but not
patents.

Source: Compiled by the Authors. This table summarizes 39 studies on institutions, governance, and
environmental performance. Studies dealing with investments and innovation not explicitly related to
the energy and environmental domains are not included in this table.
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Table 3A: Literature Survey: Institutions, Governance, and Environmental Policy (Adoption and
Implementation)
Paper

Dependent Variable (s)

Explanatory Variables

Methodology

Result

Congleton (1992).
Political Institutions and Pollution Control.

Signature of Vienna and
Montreal Protocol on CFC

Democracy (Gastil, 1987)

Cross-section Logit
118 countries

Neumayer (2002).
Do democracies exhibit stronger international
environmental commitment? A cross-country
analysis.

Signing and ratification of multilateral
environmental agreements; membership in
environmental intergovernmental
organizations; reporting requirements for
the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora;
percentage of a country’s land area under
protection; existence of a National Council
on Sustainable Development; and
availability of environmental information
Index of stringency of environmental
regulations on agricultural sector.

Democracy (Freedom House,
Polity IV, Vanhanen’s Index,
and Voice and Accountability
- WB)

Cross-section Probit and
OLS
100-175 countries,
around the year 2000

Authoritarian regimes enact less
stringent environmental standards
than democratic regimes. Liberal
democracies are more willing to
regulate environmental effluents
and international agreements on
environmental matters attract more
signatories as the number of
democratic regimes increases.
Democracies sign and ratify more
multilateral environmental
agreements, participate in more
environmental intergovernmental
organizations, comply better with
reporting requirements under the
Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Fauna
and Flora.

Corruption (Political Risk
Services and ICRG) and
Democracy (Freedom House)

Cross-section OLS
63 countries for 1990

Murdoch et al. (2003).
The participation decision versus the level of
participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial
probit analysis
Damania et al. (2003).
The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory
Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence.

Helsinki protocol ratification and sulfur
emissions (1990 levels minus 1980 levels)

Democracy proxy - civil and
political freedom Gastil
(1989)

Two-stage game and
spatial probit
25 European countries

Compliance with international
environmental agreements.

Cross-section OLS and
2SLS

Fredriksson et al. (2004).
Corruption and Energy
Efficiency in OECD Countries: Theory and
Evidence.

Sector specific energy policy stringency

Judicial efficiency
(Kauffman), political stability
(Kauffman), civic freedom
(Frasier Institute), and
corruption (TI)
Corruption (TI), worker
influence, and lobbying

Fredriksson and Millimet (2004).
Electoral rules and environmental policy.

Environmental Sustainability Index,
Environmental Governance Index,
Environmental Efficiency Index,
International Environmental Agreements
Participation Index, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Index
Environmental Treaty Participation
Index - participation on 22 international
environmental treaties

Fredriksson and Svensson (2003).
Political instability, corruption and policy
formation: the case of environmental policy.

Roberts et al. (2004).
Who Ratifies Environmental Treaties and
Why? Institutionalism, Structuralism and
Participation by 192 Nations in 22 Treaties.

Panel OLS
12 OECD countries (11
sectors)
1982–1996

More corrupt countries have less
stringent environmental
regulations while democratic
countries also have less stringent
regulations.
Democracy reduces probability of
protocol ratification.

Corruption reduces the level of
compliance of environmental
regulations while civic freedom
and judicial efficiency increases
compliance.
Corruption increases energy waste
by reducing stringency of energy
regulations. Worker lobby is
relatively influential in those
sectors in which the capital owners
have relatively minor impact, and
vice versa.
Governments set stricter
environmental policies under
proportional, as opposed to
majoritarian systems.

Rules governing the
assignment of legislative
seats

Cross-section OLS and
2SLS
86 countries

Index of Voice and
Accountability, Government
Effectiveness Index
(Kauffman et al., 2003), and
Number of NGOs
Environmental lobby;
Democratic participation; and
Democratic competition

Cross-section OLS,
192 countries,
1999

Positive relationship with national
propensity to sign environmental
treaties.

Cross-section OLS, 2SLS,
Tobit
104 countries,
1993, 1996, and 2000

Greater political competition and
number of environmental groups
raises the stringency of
environmental policies. However,
democratic participation affects
environmental policy stringency
only in countries with sufficiently
high degree of political
competition.
Bicameralism has a positive effect
on gasoline taxes, which is
magnified as political stability
increases and veto players are less
corruptible. Similar interaction
effect of bicameralism and the
degree of corruptibility for several
other measures of environmental
policy stringency.
Greater environmental lobby
strength raises the probability of
ratification but greater number of
government unites reduce the
impact of agreements.
FDI raises environmental policy
stringency where number of
legislative units is high.

Fredriksson et al. (2005).
Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution
control.

Regulation of lead content in gasoline

Fredriksson and Millimet (2007).
Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation.

Environmental protection and pollution
taxation

Veto, bicameralism, political
instability, and corruption
Kaufmann et al. (2003) index

Three-stage game
Cross-section
86 countries

Fredriksson and Ujhelyi (2005).
Political institutions, interest groups, and the
Ratification of international environmental
agreements.

Probability of Kyoto protocol ratification

Government units,
environmental lobby,
democracy (Freedom House),

Logit and stratified hazard
model
170 countries
1998-2002

Cole and Fredriksson (2006).
Institutionalized pollution havens.

1st stage: FDI stock
2nd stage: Environmental policy

FE 2SLS
33 countries 1982-1992

Fredriksson et al. (2007).
Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government
corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?

Kyoto Protocol ratification

Government checks and
balances; political constraints
within the legislature; and
government honesty (ICRG)
Democracy (Freedom House,
corruption (TI), integrity
(WB, TI, ICRG), and

Cox proportional
hazard model
170 countries

Democratic countries ratify earlier,
environmental lobbying raises the
ratification probability, while
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environmental lobbying

1998-2002

Bättig and Bernauer (2009).
National Institutions and Global Public Goods:
Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate
Change Policy?

Policy Index: commitment to mitigation
process
Policy outcomes: in terms of emission
levels and trends

Democracy

Panel regression
185 countries
1990–2004

Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2011). Corruption,
Democracy, and Environmental
Policy: An Empirical Contribution to the Debate

Environmental
Protection Stringency (Eliste and
Fredriksson, 2002) and Environmental
Regulatory Regime Index (Esty and Porter,
2002)
Number of climate laws passed and
flagship legislation

Corruption (TI), Democracy
(Polity IV), and Index of
democracy (Vanhanen, 2000)

Cross-section OLS 51-62
countries

Polity2 (Polity IV), partypolitical orientation of the
government, and international
influences

Negative binomial and FE
Logit
63 countries
1990-2012

Fankhauser et al. (2014).
Domestic dynamics and international influence:
What explains the passage of climate change
legislation?

increased environmental lobby
group activity raises the
probability of Kyoto Protocol
ratification and the effect raises
with the degree of corruption.
Effect of democracy on
commitment to global
public goods provision is positive
while effect of democracy
on policy outcomes are
ambiguous.
Effect on environmental policy
stringency is negative for
corruption but no evidence
significant effect of democracy.
No significant impact of political
orientation. Propensity to legislate
is heavily influenced by the
passage of similar laws in other
countries.

Source: Compiled by the Authors. This table summarizes 16 studies on institutions, governance, and
environmental policy.
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